Tactical Adaptation
Why do some violent non-state actors (NSA) experiment with tactics while others fall into tactical routines, repeating the same approaches over and over again? NSAs vary markedly in the size and usage of the tactical repertoires that they employ in their campaign to alter the status quo. The research project examines why some NSAs experiment with and develop a broad repertoire of tactics and targets to achieve their political aims while other groups consistently utilize the same methods across their lifespan.
In this project, I examine the internal organizational drivers for tactical innovation and adaptation in violent organizations. I develop a theory of membership diversity as an internal driver of tactical adaptation. The project aims to contribute to the study of violent political conflict by treating membership diversity as an information problem.
Moreover, I introduce novel ways of measuring tactical behavior of armed groups. I demonstrate how one can leverage a violent non-state organization’s event history record to analyze the similarity between its violent actions across time to understand when organizations vary their use of tactics. I show that violent non-state organizations are more likely to enter into negotiations with and gain concessions from the state when varying tactics.